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IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO: THE DANCE OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE ON
ARBITRATION ENFORCEMENT AND OHIO LAW
Ann Marie Tracey* and Kathleen McGarvey Hidy**
I. INTRODUCTION

New limits the U.S. Supreme Court has imposed on collective action,
state law arbitration exclusions, and the availability of a judicial forum
for resolving statutory claims have dramatically altered the dispute
resolution landscape. 1 This jurisprudence stands in stark contrast to

previous rulings. Where once the Court staunchly guarded the right to a
judicial forum for a statutory claim like a civil rights violation, it now
dismisses this right in the presence of an arbitration clause. 2 Where the
Court previously frowned upon a prospective waiver of a right to

litigate,3 such a waiver now makes arbitration the exclusive remedy if
and when a claim eventually arises.4 Where the Court formerly
permitted class actions as vehicles to prosecute and effectively vindicate
collective claims, it now allows an arbitration clause to trump the right
to bring a class action in court.
In step with the Court's decisions, businesses have modified all types
of contracts to include individual arbitration agreements as the parties'
exclusive remedy,5 sometimes leaving the consumer without recourse to
* Ann Marie Tracey, J.D., Professor of Legal Studies, Xavier University. Prof. Tracey is a
retired Common Pleas Judge and former Assistant United States Attorney and Chair of the Ohio Ethics
Commission.
** Kathleen McGarvey Hidy, J.D., Visiting Professor of Legal Studies, Xavier University.
Prof. Hidy is a former corporate litigator, assistant prosecuting attorney, and United States District Court
law clerk.
Special thanks go to Madeline High, Xavier University Class of 2016, for her invaluable research help.
1. For a discussion of this with respect to consumer cases, see Sarah Rudolph Cole, The
Federalizationof Consumer Arbitration:PossibleSolutions, 2013 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 271, 273-76 (2013).
2. See generally, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); AT&T Mobility LLC
v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
3. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
4. See generally Pyett, 556 U.S. 247.
5. These clauses are so ubiquitous that "it has become increasingly difficult to apply for a credit
card, use a cellphone, get cable or Internet service, or shop online without agreeing to private
arbitration." Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, ArbitrationEverywhere, Stacking the Deck of
2015),
31,
(Oct.
TIMES
N.Y.
Justice,
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/1 1/01/business/dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-ofjustice.html. This is also true in the areas of employment or car rental. Id. One hundred percent of cell
phone contracts contain an arbitration clause. Ann Marie Tracey & Shelley McGill, Supreme Court October Term 2010: Seeking a Rational Lawyer for Consumer Claim After the Supreme Court
Disconnects Consumers in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 45 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 435, 465 n.179
(2012) [hereinafter Seeking a RationalLawyer].
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The arbitration

agreements extend their reach to include statutory claims (such as
discrimination claims), requiring the parties to forego relief from a
judicial forum. These contractual provisions dictate that arbitration will
resolve all matters arising from the relationship that formed the basis for
the contract with finality, and can even extend to claims of wrongful
death and rape.7 Aggrieved parties are stripped of their ability to pursue
claims through a class action in arbitration agreements banning
Further, arbitration agreements contain
collective action. 8

confidentiality clauses in both consumer and business contracts, thus
prohibiting similarly situated claimants from sharing information,
experts, or costs. 9 Some clauses contain stipulations likely to influence

the outcome, such as requiring the arbitrators to be Christian, or even
requiring that a dispute involving a former Scientology member be
10 Others require thatthe Bible, not
heard by a panel of Scientologists.
11
law, guide the arbitration.
These developments in contracts have skewed dispute resolution

soundly in favor of business. As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg noted in
her dissent in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, "this Court has again
expanded the scope of the [Federal Arbitration Act], further degrading
the rights of consumers and further insulating already powerful

economic entities from liability for unlawful acts."' 12 As one federal
judge observed, the proliferation of arbitration agreements "is among the
most profound shifts in our legal history," with business ominously
having "a good chance of opting out of the legal system altogether and

misbehaving without reproach." 13 Especially for small claims, it is not14
worth it for consumers to pursue individual arbitration, and few do.
6. For a discussion of the disparate bargaining power between consumers and business, see
Seeking a RationalLawyer, supranote 5, at 461-62.
7. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supranote 5.
8. Id. According to these authors, "[b]y banning class actions, companies have essentially
disabled consumer challenges to practices like predatory lending, wage theft and discrimination." Id.
9. See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (upholding a
class action waiver even though the contract at issue prohibited such sharing, making individual action
effectively cost prohibitive). For the impact of such contract restrictions with respect to the ability to
obtain an effective remedy, see Shelley McGill & Ann Marie Tracey, The Next Chapter:Revisiting the
Policy in Favor of Arbitration in the Context of Effective Vindication of Statutory Claims, 31 ARIZ. J.
INT'L & COMP. L. 547, 561 (2014) [hereinafter The Next Chapter].
10. See Michael Corkery & Jessica Silver-Greenberg, In Religious Arbitration,Scripture Is the
Rule of Law, N.Y. TtMES (Nov. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/inreligious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-law.html.
11. Id.
12. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 478 (2015) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supranote 5.
14. A New York Times study "found that from 2010 to 2014, only 505 consumers went to
arbitration over a dispute of $2,500 or less." Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Upholds Arbitration in
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Likewise, lawyers 15are not willing to pursue small claims absent a critical
mass of plaintiffs.
Recent Supreme Court decisions and the corresponding explosion of
arbitration agreements have ushered in new questions and uncertainties
about the application of the laws of Ohio and other states in arbitration
disputes. Because of these developments, whether and to what extent
state law contract defenses grounded in law and equity, and provided for
under both the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 16 and the Ohio Arbitration
Act, 17 remain available avenues to defeat arbitration agreements is a
question that must now be addressed by the courts. Another important
question is whether the FAA's supremacy falters where public policy
considerations and state law, such as the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices
Act (CSPA), 18 potentially temper arbitration enforcement.
The answers to these questions lie in the FAA, which is discussed at
length in Part II, and three Supreme Court decisions, 14 Penn Plaza,
LLC v. Pyett,1 9 AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion,20 and American
Express Company v. Italian Colors Restaurant.2 1 Each of these cases is
addressed individually in Part III. Part IV of this Article examines how
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has an impact on Ohio jurisprudence.
Finally, Part V of this Article explores whether the Court's newest
22
decision enforcing arbitration agreements, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia,
may displace Ohio contract and statutory laws that safeguard the rights
of contracting parties.
II. THE FAA: CONGRESS BOWS TO THE COMMON LAW OF CONTRACTS
A judicial hostility for enforcing arbitration agreements prompted
Congress to enact the FAA in 1925.23 The FAA is backed by a strong
federal policy to encourage arbitration.24 It mandates that courts enforce
DirecTV Case (Dec. 14, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/15/us/politics/supreme-court-upholdsarbitration-in-directtv-case.html?_r=0.
15. In AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court upheld a class action waiver in
an arbitration agreement. See 563 U.S. 333 (2011). As Justice Stephen Breyer noted in his dissent,
"[w]hat rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the
possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?" Id. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting.)
16. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2006).
17. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2711.
18. OHIO REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01-.13 (West 2012).
19. 556 U.S. 247 (2009).
20. 563 U.S. 333 (2011).
21. 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).
22. 136 S.Ct.463 (2015).
23. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339.
24. This is expressed in the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-16 (2012). For a discussion
of this policy in the context of statutory and public interest claims brought by merchants in American
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the agreements of parties to arbitrate disputes, and provides that
arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract., 25 As federal substantive law regarding arbitration extends to
both federal and state courts,2 6 state courts similarly must enforce
arbitration agreements when appropriate. Pursuant to the FAA, federal
and state courts examine threshold issues that include the authority of an
arbitrator,27 and whether an arbitration agreement is enforceable with
respect to a particular kind of dispute. 28
Both the policy behind the passage of the FAA and the language
Congress embedded in the statute dictate that state contract law be
enforced consistently with the contract's terms and the intent of the
parties. Enforceability and revocation of arbitration agreements revolve
around "defenses at law or equity" that state common law governs.
Such common law contract defenses traditionally have provoked
questions on how courts should view disparity of power,
unconscionability, and the inability to effectively vindicate claims. This
understanding of rooting judicial interpretation of arbitration agreements
in the common law of contracts may be undercut by the Supreme
Court's recent jurisprudence on enforceability of arbitration agreements
in varying contexts.
When defenses at law or equity come into play, the enforceability of
an arbitration contract can become a convoluted and challenging task.
This is especially true when the presumption in favor of enforcing an
arbitration clause butts up against rights secured by common law. State
statutory law providing a right to sue in a judicial forum or to proceed
by way of a class 29 further complicates a more traditional analysis. It
Express v. Italian Colors Restaurant, see The Next Chapter,supra note 9. For a discussion of this policy
in the consumer context, see Seeking a Rational Lawyer, supra note 5, at 463-68. For how the policy is
applied in the labor context, see Shelley McGill & Ann Marie Tracey, Building A New Bridge Over
Troubled Waters: Lessons Learned from Canadian and U.S. Arbitration of Human Rights and
DiscriminationEmployment Claims, 20 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Building a
New Bridge].
25. 9 U.S.C.S. § 2 (West 2015). This applies to "[a] written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a
controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or
any part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal ....Id.
26. Preston v. Ferrer, 552 U.S. 346, 349 (2008). But see Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 471 (Thomas, J.
dissenting) ("Thus, the FAA does not require state courts to order arbitration.").
27. See, e.g., Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 685 (2010); Oxford
Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S.Ct. 2064, 2070 (2013).
28. For instance, in both Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) and Penn Plaza
LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009), the issue before the Court was whether the waiver of a judicial
forum in the arbitration agreement was enforceable with respect to a discrimination claim.
29. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005) (holding that arbitration
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may even call into question whether contracts are evaluated in light of
state law. Such is the nature of the issues
that the Supreme Court
30
considered in DIRECTV, Inc. v. lmburgia.

III.

THE SUPREME COURT: MARCHING TO THE BEAT OF A
DIFFERENT DRUM

Historically, arbitration agreements encompassed disputes arising
under the terms and conditions of a contract. These clauses typically
required arbitration before litigation, or even binding arbitration without
allowing judicial recourse.3 1
For instance, in the unionized
environment, arbitrations resolved claims arising from the terms and
conditions of the collective bargaining agreement such as wage, hour
and seniority disputes. They did not, however, limit the accessibility of
a judicial forum for statutory claims.32 When arbitration provisions
expanded to block the ability to litigate even statutory claims, the Court
nevertheless preserved access to statutory remedies. Similarly, the Court
looked favorably on defenses at law and in equity that the FAA
specifically recognized.33
The Court has looked at these issues through a new, pro-business
lens. In so doing it may have placed into question the role of state
common and statutory law in interpreting contracts and recognizing
contractual defenses in law and equity. The cases the Court has
examined have run the gamut from consumer to merchant, collective to
individual, and contractual to statutory claims. The most notable of
cases reflecting the Court's approach to arbitration pertain to the
availability of a judicial forum to bring statutory claims and the
opportunity to proceed by way of a collective action.
A. ArbitrationAgreements and the Availability of a JudicialForum
As businesses became bolder, arbitration agreements expanded to
include a waiver of the right to litigate even statutory claims like
discrimination claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 34 or the
clauses prohibiting class action arbitration were unenforceable).
30. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
31. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 38 (1974) (deciding "under what
circumstances, if any, an employee's statutory right to a trial de novo under Title V1i may be foreclosed
by prior submission of his claim to final arbitration under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective
bargaining agreement.").
32. See id. at 59-60.
33. See The Next Chapter,supra note 9, at 553.
34. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 253, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e2000e-17 (2012).
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Age Discrimination in Employment Act.35 Nevertheless, the Court
preserved the right to litigate these non-contractual issues postarbitration. As the Court stated in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Company,
Title VII's strictures are absolute and represent a
Congressional command that each employee be free
from discriminatory practices. Of necessity, the rights
conferred can form no part of the collective-bargaining
process since waiver of these rights would defeat the
paramount Congressional purpose behind Title VII. In
Title
these circumstances, an employee's rights under
36
VII are not susceptible of prospective waiver.
One key to the Court's decision in this case was that the Title VII
claim had not yet arisen when the contract containing the arbitration
37
clause (with its waiver of a judicial forum) was executed.
Consequently, an individual signing an employment contract with a
mandatory arbitration clause could still litigate statutory claims, like
discrimination, in a judicial forum after completing arbitration.
In Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corp.,38 the Court again
distinguished between contractual and statutory claims. Noting that the
plaintiffs "statutory claim [is] not subject to a presumption of
arbitrability[J,]" 3 9 it upheld the right to proceed in a judicial forum on
claims under the Americans with Disability Act of 1990.40 However, it
left open the door to 41the enforceability of a "clear and unmistakable
waiver" of this forum.
42
The Court walked through this door in 14 Penn PlazaLLC v. Pyett.
There, plaintiffs' union, as the exclusive bargaining agent, had signed a
collective bargaining agreement that denied plaintiffs the availability of
a judicial forum for their statutory age discrimination claim; instead it
required such a dispute be resolved by binding arbitration. 43 As such, it
fit the mold of a classic "prospective waiver" which the Alexander Court

35. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602, codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2012).
36. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 51-52.
37. Id. at 59-60.
38. 525 U.S. 70 (1998).
39. Id. at 79.
40. Pub. L. 101-336, 104 Stat. 328, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
41. Wright, 525 U.S. at 82 (1974).
42. 556 U.S. 247 (2009). In Pyett, the waiver issue basically was not raised on appeal. See id. at
273.
1 43. Id.
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had denounced. 4 Finally, the union of which they were members had
refused to bring the claims to arbitration.4 5 These circumstances left
plaintiffs without an ability to effectively vindicate their claim, a classic
reason to permit them to proceed in court. The Court held that members
of the collective bargaining unit were bound by the arbitration clause to
which the bargaining unit had agreed,46 even though it left them with no
recourse. In the wake of Pyett, arbitration can be the exclusive remedy
for seeking vindication of even discrimination claims.4 7
B. ArbitrationAgreements, Class Actions, and Unconscionability
Language banning class actions in both commercial and employment
consumer contracts is now frequently part of the boilerplate provisions
of arbitration agreements. 48 While it seems logical that the Court would
enforce such contractual provisions, the case context in which the Court
has done so has given rise to vigorous dissents. 49 In its rejection of state
law with respect to unconscionability of class waivers in arbitration
agreements, the Court began undermining defenses and state contract
law.
The FAA prevents enforcement of an arbitration clause where a
"ground[] exist[s] at law or in equity. ' ' 50 Unconscionability is one such
ground that courts have longed recognized as a defense against contract
enforcement. Unconscionability is defined on a state-by-state basis,5 1
with most states examining a "combination of procedural and
52
substantive unconscionability."
This defense raised its head in California and was the focus of
53
Supreme Court scrutiny in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.
California statutes provided that a court "may so limit the application of
54
an unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result."
Pursuant to this enabling legislation, in Discover Bank v. Superior
44. Alexander, 415 U.S at 51-52,

45. Pyett, 556 U.S. at 253,
46. Id. at 256-57.
47. For a discussion of Pyett, see Building a New Bridge, supranote 24, at 25-31.

48. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supranote 5.
49. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009) (Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting);
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan,
JJ., dissenting); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013) (Kagan, Breyer, and
Ginsburg, JJ. dissenting).
50. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
51. See Doctor's Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 685 (1996). For a discussion of
unconscionability, see Seeking a RationalLawyer, supranote 5, at 442-50.
52. Seeking a Rational Lawyer, supra note 5, at 443.
53. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 337-38 (2011).
54. CAL. CIV. CODE ANN.§ 16720.5(a) (West 2015).
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Court,55 the California Supreme Court declared unconscionable certain

arbitration agreements that contained a waiver of the right to proceed in
arbitration by way of a class action. This determination became known
as the "Discover Bank" rule.56 This rule had rendered such class action

57
waivers unenforceable in a broad range of consumer contracts.

Subsequently, "California courts ... frequently applied this rule to find

arbitration agreements unconscionable.

'8

The U.S. Supreme Court examined and eviscerated the DiscoverBank
rule in 2011 in Concepcion.5 9 In this case, plaintiffs had asserted that a
sales tax imposed on the purchase of a phone ran counter to AT&T's

offer of a "free" phone and filed suit, which was then consolidated as a

class action. 60 The cell phone contract at issue mandated individual
arbitration and required that consumers waive both class action rights
and a judicial forum other than small claims court.6 1 In Concepcion, a
5-4 decision, the Court upheld the contract language that mandated
individual arbitrations of plaintiffs' claims. 62 It characterized the
Discover Bank rule as standing "as an obstacle to the accomplishment
and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress," and was
"pre-empted by the FAA."63 In reinforcing the FAA policy enforcing

arbitration agreements, the Court rejected California courts' ability to set

64 It
a blanket standard for unconscionability in consumer contracts.

would do so again at the close of 2015 in Imburgia, rejecting lower

courts' applications of pre-Concepcion law to an arbitration agreement
state." 65
executed before Concepcion that evoked "the law of your
The Concepcion decision curtails efforts by individual states to
address essential features of arbitrations, such as cost, efficiency,

55. 113 P.3d 1100 (Cal. 2005).
56. Seeking a Rational Lawyer, supra note 5, at 449.
57. "[W]hen the waiver is found in a consumer contract of adhesion in a setting in which
disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages, and when it is
alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat
large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money, then ... the waiver becomes in
practice the exemption of the party 'from responsibility for [its] own fraud, or willful injury to the
person or property of another.' Under these circumstances, such waivers are unconscionable under
California law and should not be enforced." Id. at 1110 (quoting CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 1668)
(citation omitted). For a discussion of the Discover Bank rule, see Seeking a Rational Lawyer, supra
note 5, at 448-49.
58. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340.
59. Id. at 352.
60. Id. at 337.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 352.
63. Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)) (internal quotations omitted).
64. See Seeking a Rational Lawyer, supra note 5, at 452-55.
65. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463,466,471 (2015).
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procedures, and the opportunity for judicial review. 66 It also raises the
question whether state statutes, such as Ohio's Consumer Sales Practices
Act, can continue to provide consumers the opportunity to "proceed as a
private attorney general" ' and
seek a claim for "declaratory judgment,
67
action.
class
or
injunction
More recently, in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors
Restaurant,68 the Supreme Court examined an issue similar to that
addressed in the Concepcion consumer case, this time in the context of
merchants who filed statutory anti-trust claims against American
Express. Merchants alleged the American Express requirement that
merchants accept all types of its cards, not just its premier one,
constituted a "tie in sale." 69 The various merchant contracts required
70
individual arbitration and that the parties waive a judicial forum.
Further, according to the dissent, "the agreement as applied in this case
cuts off not just class arbitration, but any avenue for sharing, shifting, or
71
shrinking necessary costs.
The lower courts found that the cost of separately employing
72
economic experts would preclude the plaintiffs from litigating claims;
this inability to effectively vindicate statutory claims fell into the FAA
enforcement exception of legal or equitable grounds. 73 The Supreme
Court disagreed. It determined that its precedent rendering arbitration
agreements unenforceable on the basis of ineffective vindication of
statutory claims may apply to administrative expenses and court costs,
but not litigation expenses. 74 The Court upheld the contractual
requirement of individual and mandatory arbitrations,7 5 leaving the
merchants only with an arbitral forum in which to seek relief.
In addition to precluding the availability of a judicial forum for
statutory claims such as discrimination claims, in the 2010 maritime
anti-trust case, Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds International
Corporation,76 the Court again blocked plaintiffs' recourse to class
arbitration. The parties had agreed to let the arbitration panel determine

66. Cole, supra note 1, at 288-89.
67. Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1169 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
68. 133 S.Ct. 2304 (2013).
69. Id. at 2308.
70. Id. The agreement required a dispute to be resolved by arbitration.
71. Id. 2310 (Kagan, Breyer, and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2308.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2310-11.
75. See id.at 2310. The Court did leave open the possibility that under some circumstances such
costs could be prohibitive. See id.at 2310-11. For a discussion of Italian Colors, unconscionability,
and class actions, see The Next Chapter,supra note 9.
76. 559 U.S. 662 (2010).
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if the arbitration agreement permitted class arbitration; they also agreed
the contract was silent on this point.77 The panel determined that class
arbitration was permissible. 78 However, the Court held that, absent
explicit agreement to class arbitration in the contract, the arbitrators had
exceeded their authority in finding class arbitration permissible. 79 In so
doing, the Court once again took a stance in favor of individual over
collective action, limiting for plaintiffs the benefits of joining resources
to pursue claims as a class in an arbitration forum. 8°
IV.

OHIO LAW, ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS, AND THE SUPREME COURT:

SHALL WE DANCE?

The Ohio Arbitration Act, like the FAA, prescribes the closing of
courthouse doors to arbitration disputes. 81 Also like the FAA, the Ohio
Arbitration Act directs courts to address equitable and legal grounds for
revoking an arbitration agreement. These courts, both before and since
the recent Supreme Court decisions announced in Pyett, Concepcion,
and American Express, recognize that they are statutorily empowered to
rule that arbitration clauses analyzed under Ohio law lack invincibility.
Enforcement or invalidation turns on Ohio law's interpretation of
multiple legal and equitable challenges including unconscionability,
public policy considerations, remedial statutory provisions, waiver,
duress, and fraud. In this way, state law defenses have remained very
much in force in Ohio.
A. The Ohio ArbitrationAct, the FAA, and the Revocation Clause
The Ohio Arbitration Act 82 provides a state law vehicle for arbitration
enforcement. Its key statutory language is substantially similar to the
FAA.83 Like the FAA, it provides that a contractual provision to submit
77. Id. at 662.
78. Id. at 663.
79. See id at 685.

80. But see Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013). There, the arbitrator had
determined that class action cases could occur according to Oxford's contract. Id. at 2067. Oxford
argued that this decision went against the company's intent and that the arbitrator overstepped his
authority. Id. The Supreme Court decided that the arbitrator did not overstep his authority and that his
decision stood because he "arguably construed" the contract, unlike in Stolt-Nielsen, where the contract
was silent. Id. at 2070-71.
81. See Arnold v. Burger King, 31 N.E.3d 687, 691-92 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015), vacated and
superseded on reconsideration, 48 N.E.3d 69 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015), appeal denied, 47 N.E.3d 166
(Ohio 2016).
82. OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 2711.01 (1991).
83. Hawkins v. O'Brien, No. 22490, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 73, at **5-6 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9,
2009).
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a "controversy" to arbitration "shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, except upon grounds that exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract." 84 The revocation clauses under the Ohio
Arbitration Act and under the FAA empower courts to examine common
law contract principles and, where relevant, to render an arbitration
provision invalid and unenforceable.
Under the Ohio Arbitration Act, there are two ways for a party to seek
enforcement of an arbitration agreement. The party may seek "indirect
enforcement" of an arbitration clause by moving to stay any pending
civil action in a trial court "until arbitration of the issue has been had in
accordance with the agreement." 85 Whether to hold a hearing on the
motion to stay is within the court's discretion. 86 Ohio law directs courts
to grant a stay of litigation in favor of arbitration, provided a valid and
enforceable agreement is in place.8 7 Alternatively, the party may seek
"direct enforcement" through a court order 88 "directing that the
arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in the written
agreement." 89 This requires the court to hold an evidentiary hearing to
rule on a request for such an order. 90 The court conducts a de novo
review to determine whether to grant the order, 91 with the trial court's
factual2 findings being "accorded appropriate deference" by a reviewing
9
court.

An initial question confronting Ohio courts is whether a claim falls
within the scope of the arbitration agreement. 93 There is a presumption

of arbitrability, and ambiguities are "'resolved in favor of arbitration'
even when an arbitration clause is limited in scope." 94 "Doubts should

84. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.01(A). See the limited exceptions in OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2711.01(B)(1)(a-e); 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2015).
85. Tami Shearer v. VCA Antech, Inc., No. 1lAP-44, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4281, at *8 (Ohio
Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2011); see also OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.02(B).
86. Maestle v. Best Buy Co., 800 N.E.2d 7, 10-11 (Ohio 2003); Shearer,2011 Ohio App. LEXIS
4281, at *9.
87. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2711.02(B). This is referred to as "indirect enforcement." See
Maestle, 800 N.E. 2d at 10-11.
88. Maestle, 800 N.E. 2d at 10.
89. OHIOREV. CODE ANN. § 2711.03(A); see also Shearer, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4281, at *8.
90. See Maestle, 800 N.E. 2d at 10-11; see also Shearer, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4281, at **8-9.
91. Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12, 15 (Ohio 2008); Varga v. Drees Co.,
No. 13CA010385, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 631, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2014).
92. Taylor Bldg., 884 N.E.2d at 15.
93. See Acad. of Med. of Cincinnati v. Aetna Health, Inc., 842 N.E.2d 488, 493 (Ohio 2006);
Varga, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 631, at *4.
94. Shy v. Navistar Int'l Corp., 781 F.3d 820, 826 (6th Cir. 2015) (quoting Bratt Enters. v. Noble
Int'l Ltd., 338 F.3d 609, 613 (6th Cir. 2003). In Shy the arbitration clause at issue was contained in a
settlement agreement and consent decree in,a class action lawsuit. It provided that "disputes over
'information or calculation' were subject to arbitration." Id. at 824-25. The court found that as the
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be resolved in favor of coverage" 95 unless "it may be said with positive
assurance that the arbitration clause is not susceptible of an
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. 9 6
In assessing whether a claim falls within the scope of an arbitration
agreement, Ohio courts can use the federal standard articulated in Fazio
v. Lehman Bros., Inc.9 7 This case asks whether "an action could be
98
maintained without reference to the contract or relationship at issue."
For example, language requiring arbitration of "any claim or
controversy arising out of or relating to the agreement" generally will
meet this requirement. 99 This language may be construed to include10 a0
tort claim if the claim touches upon matters covered the agreement.
This test "allows courts to make determinations of arbitrability based
upon the factual allegations in the complaint" apart from "the legal
However, the existence of an arbitration
theories presented." 10 1
not mean that every dispute
agreement between the parties 10"does
2
arbitrable."
is
parties
the
between

claim addressed a disputed report concerning financial calculations, it was subject to arbitration. Id. at
827.
95. Acad. ofMed, 842 N.E.2d at 492 (quoting Council of Smaller Enters. v. Gates, McDonald &
Co., 687 N.E.2d 1352, 1356 (Ohio 1998)) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
96. See Alexander v. Wells Fargo Fin. Ohio 1, Inc., 911 N.E.2d 286, 288 (Ohio 2009) (quoting
Acad. ofMed., 842 N.E.2d at 492) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
97. 340 F.3d 386 (6th Cir. 2003).
98. Acad. of Med, 842 N.E.2d at 494 (quoting Fazio, 340 F.3d at 395); Alexander, 911 N.E.2d at
290 (quoting Fazio, 340 F.3d at 395). The "paradigm" of what constitutes a broad arbitration clause is
the language "any claim or controversy arising out of or relating to the agreement." Varga v. Drees Co.,
No. 13CAO 10385, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 631, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 24, 2014) (quoting Acad. of
Med, 842 N.E.2d at 493-94) (internal quotations omitted); see also Hicks v. The Cadle Co., No. 2013T-0017, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 837, at *7 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2014).
99. Acad. of Med., 842 N.E.2d at 492-93 (quoting Collins & Aikman Prods. Co. v. Bldg. Sys.
Inc., 58 F.3d 16, 20) (2d Cir. 1995)); see also Varga, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 631, at *6 (quoting Acad.
of Med., 842 N.E.2d at 492-93). The court in Varga referred to this language as the "paradigm" of what
constitutes a broad arbitration clause. Id. (quoting Acad. of Med, 842 N.E.2d at 492-93). See also
Hicks, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 837 at *13 (finding that the counterclaims filed by debt collection
companies and a separate defendant were not governed by the arbitration provision in the note).
100. For example, in Alexander, the Ohio Supreme Court held that an arbitration clause in a
mortgage agreement applied even though the loan had been paid in full. Alexander, 911 N.E.2d at 289.
Plaintiffs in consolidated cases had sued Wells Fargo in a class action claiming that Wells Fargo failed
to timely file satisfaction of mortgage. The mandatory arbitration clause in the mortgage agreement
covered any claim "arising out of ... or relating to" the mortgage; one mortgage agreement specifically
provided that the mandatory arbitration provision applied even if the loan had been paid in full. Id. at
289. See also Acad. ofMed, 842 N.E.2d at 492 ("However, that standard must be consistent with Ohio
law and must reflect a correct statement of the applicable federal jurisprudence.").
101. Acad. of Med, 842 N.E.2d at 494.
102. Id.
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B. The Ohio JurisprudenceArbitrationLandscape
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent rulings enforcing arbitration
agreements, Ohio courts scrutinized arbitration clauses for defects that
might render them invalid. Arbitration clause enforcement in Ohio
focused on whether and how arbitration provisions conflicted with
common law contract defenses such as unconscionability, or0 3with state
statutes like the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act (CSPA).
Unconscionability was and remains a chief challenge to arbitration
enforcement. Under Ohio law, unconscionability renders an arbitration
agreement unenforceable 0 4 based on the revocation clauses of the FAA
and the Ohio Arbitration Act. This defense "includes both an absence of
meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with
05
contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.'
For an arbitration agreement to be rendered unconscionable under Ohio
law, it must be adjudged to be both substantively and procedurally
unconscionable. 10 6 Substantive unconscionability analyzes the factors
concerning the contract terms themselves, where procedural
unconscionability analyzes factors relating to the bargaining positions of
the parties, such as "age, education, intelligence, [and] business
acumen."' 1 7 When mandatory arbitration clauses appear in contracts
between consumers and retailers, the Ohio Supreme Court has
recognized that these provisions "are subject to considerable skepticism
due to the disparity in the bargaining positions of the
upon review,
10 8
parties.'
Conceptually distant from the U.S. Supreme Court's approach in
Concepcion, Ohio courts found procedural unconscionability where
businesses drafted arbitration clauses into adhesion contracts with
consumers. 10 9 This occurred where there was disparity in bargaining
power between the parties due to economic and educational imbalances
between the parties, 110 a lack of sophistication and experience in
commercial transactions, and a lack of legal representation."'
Substantive unconscionability existed in arbitration provisions with
103. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 1345.01-.13 (West 2012).
104. See, e.g., Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 866-67 (Ohio 1998).
105. Taylor Bldg. Corp. of Am. v. Benfield, 884 N.E.2d 12, 20 (Ohio 2008) (quoting Lake Ridge

Acad. v. Carney, 613 N.E.2d 183, 189 (Ohio 1993)) (internal quotations omitted).
106. See Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 809 N.E.2d 1161, 1170-71 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
107. Id. at 1171.
108. Id. at 1179 (citing Williams v. Aetna Fin. Co., 700 N.E.2d 859, 866 (Ohio 1998)).
109. See Eagle, 809 N.E.2d at 1179.
110. See Schwartz v. Alltel Corp., No. 86810, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3280, at **15-16 (Ohio Ct.
App. June 29, 2006).
111. See id.; see also Eagle, 809 N.E.2d at 1177-80.
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loser pay provisions, mandated secrecy,
and excessive fees and costs
12
associated with the arbitration process.'
Thwarting public policy can be an additional basis for a court to
invalidate an arbitration agreement. It is distinguished from an
unconscionability ground in that the focus is not "on the relationship
between the parties and the effect of the agreement upon them" but
rather on a "public policy analysis [which] requires the court to consider
the impact of such arrangements upon society as a whole.
A contract
'1 13
injurious to the interests of the state will not be enforced."
Ohio's CSPA promotes public policy and, according to Ohio courts,
can sometimes trump an arbitration agreement. 114 Similar to the
consumer statute at issue in Concepcion, with respect to providing relief
for deceptive or unconscionable consumer contracts, the CSPA provides
for a private right of action and rescission of the contract or a suit for
damages. 115 It allows the consumer to seek injunctive relief and to
proceed in a class action. 1 6 It also permits the prevailing party to
recover "reasonable attorney's fee[s]."' 17 Where both an arbitration
agreement and a CSPA claim are at issue, the courts evaluate both in
determining
whether a plaintiff can proceed as a class and in a judicial
118
forum.

In Eagle v. Fred Martin Motor Company, an arbitration clause in a

car purchase agreement precluded the parties from proceeding as a class
action or as a private attorney general. 119 It also invoked arbitration
rules imposing confidentiality requirements that restricted the public
sharing of information. 120 These aspects of the arbitration clause
impeded the "remedial function" and "consumer protection" purposes of
the CSPA. 121 On the other hand, excessive costs and insufficient notice
of arbitration details rendered the arbitration clause both procedurally
and substantively unconscionable. 122 The likely arbitration costs of an
approximate range 23of $750 on a $75,000 claim constituted substantive

unconscionability. 1
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
2009).
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Eagle, 809 N.E.2d at 1170-80.
Id. at 1180 (citing King v. King, 59 N.E. 111, 112 (Ohio 1900)).
SeeEagle, 809 N.E. 2d at 1183.
OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 1345.09(A).
Id. § 1345.09(D)-(E).
Id. § 1345.09(F).
See Hawkins v. O'Brien, No. 22490, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 73 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9,
809 N.E.2d 1161 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 1183.
Id.
Id.at 1177-80.
Id. at 1173, 1177. Projected estimates for the entire arbitration-related fees ranged between
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124
The CSPA was also pivotal in Schwartz v. Alltel Corporation.
There, the court used both an unconscionability analysis as well as a
public policy lens in finding the arbitration requirement in that case
unenforceable. 125 Because the arbitration clause limited a "right to
proceed [as] a class action" and to recover attorney fees, the court ruled
that the "clause invades the policy considerations of the CSPA."' 126 This
limit on consumer rights established the necessary "quantum of
substantive unconscionability." 127 The court also found procedural
respect to the disparity of bargaining positions
unconscionability with
128
parties.
the
between
In other cases where arbitration agreements were challenged on
unconscionability or public policy grounds, courts have resisted the
invitation to invalidate the agreements. In Taylor Building Corporation
of America v. Benfield,129 the Ohio Supreme Court addressed the issue
of unconscionability in a home construction contract. While noting that
consumer contracts with standardized and mandated terms demand
heightened judicial scrutiny, the court cautioned that a pre-printed or
mandatory arbitration clause did not per se render the arbitration
provisions unconscionable; nor did the unequal bargaining power of the
parties. 130 In Hawkins v. O'Brien,131 the court rejected challenges to a
payday loan arbitration agreement on public policy and
unconscionability grounds. The arbitration clause at issue prevented the
plaintiff from proceeding as a private attorney general and through a
class action vehicle. 132 Hawkins argued that the arbitration agreement
Because he had signed an
was not called to his attention.
the court rejected this
contract,
the
read
had
acknowledgement that he
133 The court also noted that the arbitration agreement did
argument.
"not contain a confidentiality clause," nor did it deny the plaintiff the
by the CSPA and Federal Fair Debt
substantive rights conferred
134
Act.
Practices
Collection
After the U.S. Supreme Court issued its decision in Pyett upholding

$4,200 and $6,000. Id. at 1177.
124. See Schwartz v. AlItel Corp., No. 86810, 2006 Ohio App. LEXIS 3280 (Ohio Ct. App. June
29, 2006).
125. Id. at *16.
126. Id. at **13-14.
127. Id. at *14.
128. Id.
129. 884 N.E.2d 12 (Ohio 2008).
130. Id. at 24.
131. Hawkins v. O'Brien, No. 22490, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 73 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2009).
132. Id. at*16.
133. Id. at *11.
134. Id. at **16-17.
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mandatory arbitration and a class action waiver in a collective
bargaining agreement, but before it had considered the class action
waiver in Concepcion, an Ohio appellate court saw no inherent
unconscionability in the waiver of a class action vehicle. In Alexander
v. Wells FargoFinancialOhio 1, Inc.,135 the court found that a waiver of
the right to file a class action lawsuit was neither unconscionable nor did
it violate public policy.
The Eighth District Court of Appeals
distinguished the case from Eagle and Schwartz on the basis that the
dispute did not arise under the CSPA, no confidentiality provision was
present in the arbitration clause, and class action prohibition was not
136
unconscionable.
C. Post Concepcion: Business As Usual
The Supreme Court in Concepcion offered no quarter for California
state law's disdain of class action waivers in arbitration agreements.
Concepcion's firm stance has not dissuaded Ohio courts from providing
a wide berth for state law application to arbitration challenges. These
courts consistently interpret Concepcion narrowly, with substantial
deference accorded to Ohio jurisprudence and public policy in assessing
the validity and enforceability of arbitration agreements. They also
resoundingly continue to rely on Ohio state law challenges, both
equitable and legal, in evaluating the enforceability of arbitration
provisions.
The import of Ohio state contract law in assessing arbitration
agreements was evident just six weeks after the Concepcion decision
was issued when an Ohio appellate court considered its scope and
applicability. In Wallace v. Ganley Auto Group,137 purchasers of preowned vehicles filed a putative class action against vehicle dealerships,
claiming violations of Ohio's CSPA as well as common law fraud. The
dealerships sought to stay the litigation and enforce the arbitration
agreements in the motor vehicle purchase contracts.
The vehicle purchasers mounted a three-pronged attack on arbitration
of this dispute, all grounded in Ohio law. First, they claimed that the
arbitration provisions were void as a matter of public policy because
they banned class arbitration.'1 38 Second, the purchasers asserted that the

135. Alexander v. Wells Fargo Fin. Ohio 1, Inc., No. 89277, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 4133 (Ohio
Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2009), on remandfrom Alexander v. Wells Fargo Fin. Ohio 1, Inc., 911 N.E.2d 286
(Ohio 2009).
136. See id. at **8-9.
137. Wallace v. Ganley Auto Grp., No. 95081, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2474 (Ohio Ct. App. June
16, 2011).
138. Id. at *7.
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procedurally
and
were
substantively
provisions
arbitration
1
39
Finally, the plaintiffs claimed that the arbitration
unconscionable.
provisions should not be interpreted under Ohio contract law principles
to govern the dispute, because "their claims originated before the
contract was signed and thus are not covered by the agreement to
arbitrate."14
While the Ohio appellate court rejected all three state law challenges,
it limited the application of the Supreme Court's ruling in
Concepcion.141 Constraining Concepcion's holding to the unique facts
of that case began with the Eighth District Court of Appeal's recognition
that California's judicial rule prohibiting class-action waivers in
arbitration agreements in consumer contracts was inconsistent and
preempted state law incursion into the province of the FAA.142 Unlike
state law contract defenses, the California rule was a frontal assault on
the FAA and directly contradicted the FAA's "'overarching purpose'
[which] is 'to ensure the enforcement of arbitration agreements
14 3
according to their terms so as to facilitate streamlined proceedings."'
The Wallace court next admonished that state contract law is at the
heart of arbitration agreements and their enforceability. It impliedly
rebuked the use of Concepcion to override any state law contract
defense to arbitration enforcement. 144 The Supreme Court specifically
had reminded courts in Concepcion that "arbitration is a matter of
contract, and thus parties may agree to limit the issues subject to
arbitration, to arbitrate according to specific rules, and to limit with
whom a party will arbitrate disputes." 145 Pointing out that Concepcion
made clear that "courts may not apply judicial rules in a way that
frustrates the purpose of the FAA," the Eighth District Court of Appeals
declined to rule that, with respect to Ohio's CSPA, class action bans in
arbitration agreements are per se unenforceable. 146 It cautioned that
139. Id. at**11-17.
140. Id. at** 18.
141. This is demonstrated by the Ohio Court of Appeals' ruling that class action bans in
arbitration agreements involving Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act claims are not per se
unenforceable and by its explanation that the judicial rule invalidated in Concepcion differed materially
from state contract law defenses in Ohio law used to invalidate arbitration agreements. See id. at **910.
142. See Id. at *9 (construing 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-307 (2012)).
143. Wallace, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2474, at *8 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
563 U.S. 333, 344 (2011)).
144. Id. at*10.
145. Id. at *8 (citing Concepcion, 563 U.S at 344).
146. Id. at **9-10. The Ohio Court of Appeals did not reach the issue of whether the Ohio
Consumer Sales Practices Act "contains a policy favoring class actions;",it did note that Concepcion
mandates that courts cannot "apply judicial rules in a way that frustrates the purpose of the FAA." Id. at
*10.
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Concepcion warns that "enforcement of arbitration clauses cannot be
conditioned upon the availability of class wide arbitration" and that the
FAA "favors the enforcement of arbitration agreements according to
their terms.'

47

The Ohio appellate court went on to consider the state law contract
defense of unconscionability which, under Ohio law, may be used to
render an arbitration agreement unenforceable 148. This question of
unconscionability, a state law analysis, was unchanged by
Concepcion.149 Also unchanged was the use of Ohio law precedent to
determine whether an arbitration provision governs a dispute."' State
law becomes the gate-keeper of how courts interpret the agreement and
that a claim should be
what, if any, evidence is needed to demonstrate
15'
arbitrate.
to
agreement
the
from
excluded
A second decision in 2011 by an Ohio appellate court confirmed that
Concepcion did not render arbitration provisions "invincible."' 52 There,
the plaintiff claimed that the costs of arbitrating a dispute arising from
the sale of a veterinary practice-in the $24,000 range-rendered the
Citing
agreement unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.
Concepcion, in Shearer v. VCA Antech, Inc., the Tenth District Court of

Appeals for Ohio noted that the language in the both the FAA and the
Ohio Arbitration Act "permits courts to invalidate arbitration provisions
upon the demonstration of a generally applicable state-law contract
defense, such as fraud, duress, or unconscionability."' 53 Examining the
issue of unconscionability154through the lens of Ohio law, the court upheld
the arbitration provision.
While acknowledging the holding of Concepcion, Ohio courts have
continued to emphasize the role of state law in determining the
enforceability of arbitration agreements, using a case-by-case analysis.
In Reyna Capital Corporation v. McKinney Romeo Motors,
Incorporated,15 a leasing company sued an automobile dealership

seeking to have an arbitration agreement in a master lease agreement

147. Id.
at **9-10.
148. Id. at **10-17.
149. See id. at *10.
150. See Wallace, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2474, at **18-20.
151. See id.
152. Tami Shearer v. VCA Antech, Inc., No. 11AP-44, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 4281, at *10
(Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 6, 2011).
153. Id.at **10-11 (citing AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 333 U.S. at 339; Hayes v.
Oakridge Home, 908 N.E.2d 408, 412 (Ohio 2009)).
154. Id. at **10-16.
155. Reyna Capital Corp. v. McKinney Romeo Motors, Inc., No. 24538, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS
5636 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 30, 2011).
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156
declared void as a violation of Ohio's Civil Rules and Constitution.
The Second District Court of Appeals held that none of these provisions
provided "grounds as exist in law or in equity for the revocation of the
contract," which the Ohio court noted was the statutory escape hatch
Concepcion deemed the FAA's "'primary substantive provision' ' ' 157 and
which the Ohio Arbitration Act reflected. 158 The issue of whether there
had been a waiver of the requirement to arbitrate was examined under
both federal and state law precedent. 159 Finally, using Ohio law
precedent to reject an argument that because a subsidiary had filed suit,
the arbitration agreement was invalid under the law of estoppel, 16 ' the
appellate court enforced the arbitration agreement.161
Two years later, another Ohio appellate court applied "Ohio's
longstanding rules of waiver" to examine the enforceability of
arbitration clauses.' 62 The Seventh District Court of Appeals, in The
FinishLine, Inc. v. Patrone,addressed whether the act of filing a lawsuit

156. Implicated were Ohio Civil Rules 1, 14, 19 and Article IV, Section 5(B) of the Ohio
Constitution. Id. at **19-23.
OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 5(B) states in relevant part:
The Supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all
courts of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any
substantive right .... All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further
force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
OHIO CIV.R. 1(B) states:
These rules shall be construed and applied to effect just results by eliminating
delay, unnecessary expense and all other impediments to the expeditious
administration ofjustice.
OHIO Civ. R. 14(A) states in relevant part:
[A] defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and
complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs [stet] claim against him.
OHIO Clv. R. 19(A) states in relevant part:
A person who is subject to service of process shall be joined as a party in the
action if (1) in his absence complete relief cannot be dbcorded among those
already parties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject ofthe action and
is so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (a) as a practical
matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (b) leave any of the
persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple,
or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest, or (3) he
has an interest relating to the subject of the action as an assignor, assignee,
subrogor, or subrogee.
157. Reyna Capital Corp., 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 5636, at *19 (quoting Concepcion, 563 U.S. at
339).
157. Id. at*19.
158. Id. at*19.
159. Id.at *26.
160. Id. at *28.
161.

Id.
162. Finish Line, Inc. v. Patrone, No. 12 MA 92, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5768, at *10 (Ohio Ct.
App. Dec. 13, 2013).
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waived the arbitration clause. 163 The court distinguished the state law
164
contract defense of waiver from the rule announced in Concepcion.
"There is a long line of precedent in Ohio holding that a party waives an
arbitration clause in a contract by filing a complaint that fails to raise the
arbitration clause."'1 65 Similarly, "[w]hen the other contracting party
files an answer and does not demand arbitration, it, in effect, agrees to
the waiver and a referral to arbitration under R.C. 2711.02 is
inappropriate." 166 Under these circumstances, "[t]he FAA does not
law."' 167 The court then refused to
serve to displace this existing Ohio
168
enforce the arbitration agreement.
In Gustavus, LLC v. Eagle Investments, 169 an Ohio appellate court
reviewed a complicated challenge to an arbitration provision in a real
estate purchase and sale contract. The Second District Court of Appeals
examined whether the arbitration provision was void and unenforceable
on grounds of public policy, vagueness and inconsistency. 170 The public
policy challenge arose from plaintiff s assertion that the arbitration
provision hindered its claim brought under the Ohio Corrupt Activities
Act1 7' by depriving it of statutory remedies under this law. 172 The
Second District Court of Appeals rejected this argument, citing the
ability under Ohio law for the judge to confirm, modify, or correct the
arbitrator's award pursuant to Ohio Revised Code 2711.12.173 Similarly,
it dismissed the void for vagueness and inconsistency arguments.' 7 4 The
court relied on Ohio law's mandate that an "arbitration clause in a
contract should not be denied effect by a court unless it may be said with
positive assurance that the clause is not susceptible to an interpretation
that covers the17 5asserted dispute, and doubts should be resolved in favor
of coverage."

163. Id.
164. Id. at *9 ("When state law prohibits outright the arbitration of a particular type of claim, the
FAA displaces the conflicting rule.") (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S 333, 341
(2011)).

165. Id. at *5.
166. Id. (quoting Mills v. Jaguar-Cleveland Motors, Inc., 430 N.E.2d 965, syllabus (Ohio Ct. App.
1980)).
167. FinishLine, 2013 Ohio App. LEXIS 5768, at *9.
168. Id. at *12.
169. Gustavus, LLC v. Eagle Invs., No. 24899, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1229 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar.
30, 2012).
170. Id. at **6.
171. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31-2923.36 (West 2015).
172. Gustavus, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1229, at **7-19.
173. Id. at *15.
174. Id. at*19-21.
175. Id.at *20 (citing Gibbons-Grable Co. v. Gilbane Bldg. Co., 517 N.E.2d 559 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986)); Krafcik v. USA Energy Consultants, Inc., 667 N.E.2d 1027 (Ohio Ct. App.1995).
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Ohio law again was prominent with respect to another claim that
arose in Gustavas. Ohio Revised Code 2711.01(B)(1) bars arbitration
"where [a] final determination of claims in an action may entitle a
claimant to relief that affects [a] title, such as specific performance of a
contract of sale."'1 76 The appellate court examined the reach of
Concepcion with respect to claims concerning disputes over the title to
or possession of real estate. 177 It noted that the Supreme Court explicitly
stated in Concepcion that the FAA's "'savings clause preserves
generally applicable contract defenses[,]"' but "'nothing in it suggests
an intent to preserve state-law rules that stand as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the FAA's objectives.' ' 178 This bar did not apply to
the motion to compel arbitration filed in this case, the Gustavus court

concluded. 179

In Helbling v. Lloyd Ward, P.C.,8 0 the Eighth District Court of
Appeals also seemed to be cautious in construing Concepcion too
broadly when there appears to be a conflict between state law and the
FAA. Ohio Rule of Professional Conduct 1.8(h) renders unenforceable
an attorney-client agreement that requires arbitrating a claim against the
lawyer, unless the client is independently represented when making the
agreement. 181 The appellate court acknowledged that this professional
conduct rule limits the arbitration provisions in legal services
agreements to cases where the client is independently represented at the
time the arbitration agreement is executed. 182 Because "Rule 1.8(h)
does not 'prohibit outright' the arbitration of claims relating to a legal
services agreement," Concepcion did not block Rule 1.8(h)'s
application. 183 The court therefore refused to enforce the arbitration

agreement. 184

In 2015, in Arnold v. Burger King, an Ohio appellate court
invalidated an arbitration agreement while acknowledging Concepcion's
clear mandate that the FAA displaces any state law prohibiting outright
the arbitration of a particular kind of claim. 185 There, a Burger King
176. See Gustavus, 2012 Ohio App. LEXIS 1229, at *8 (citing Kedzior v. CDC Dev. Corp., 704
N.E.2d 54 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997)).
177. -1d. at **10-12.
178. Id. at *11 (quoting AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 343 (2011)).
179. Id. at **11-12.
180. Helbling v. Lloyd Ward, P.C., No. 99991, 2014 Ohio App. LEXIS 1462 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr.
10, 2014).
181. Id. at *6.
182. Id. at *7.
183. Id. at * 7.
184. Id. at *6-7.
185. Arnold v. Burger King, 31 N.E.3d 687, 691, 695 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015), vacated and
superseded on reconsideration, 48 N.E.3d 69 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015), appeal denied, 47 N.E.3d 166
(Ohio 2016) (quoting Marmet Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. Brown, 132 S. Ct. 1201, 1203 (2012)).
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employee, raped by her supervisor at work, successfully argued that the
arbitration agreement executed at her hiring was unconscionable under
Ohio law and therefore unenforceable. Citing the Supreme Court's
1 86
decision in Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, the Ohio court
concluded that it was "free to find the arbitration agreement
unenforceable for common law reasons, such as invalid formation of the
contract or unconscionability."18 7 The Supreme Court in Marmet had
explicitly stated that even when a plaintiffs claims clearly fall within
the scope of an agreement to arbitrate, a court must "consider whether,
absent th[e] general policy, the arbitration clauses in [plaintiffs cases]
are unenforceable under state common law principles that are not
188 The Arnold court
specific to arbitration and pre-empted by the FAA."
then analyzed the state law challenge to the arbitration agreement under
Ohio law on unconscionability. It found the arbitration agreement
procedurally unconscionable because of a combination of the disparity
in bargaining power and misleading contract language that could lull a
It was substantively
party into "a false sense of security." '1 89
unconscionable in that the agreement "sought to include every possible
situation that might arise in an employee's life," and "the arbitrator
190 The court
would be resolving disputes unrelated to employment."
Burger King's arbitration agreement as unconscionable
then invalidated 191
under Ohio law.
Federal courts also interpret Concepcion to provide Ohio courts wide
192
latitude in applying Ohio law principles of unconscionability,
194
collateral estoppel and res judicata, 1 93 waiver, and the impact of a fee195
arbitration provision.
an
of
splitting provision on the enforceability
Post-Concepcion, the Sixth Circuit examines Ohio law's impact on
arbitration agreements in a similar way: narrowly construing
Citing
Concepcion's prohibition on state law conflicting rules.
186. 132 S. Ct. 1201.
187. Arnold, 31 N.E.3d at 691 (brackets in original).

188. Id. (quoting Marmet,132 S.Ct. at 1204) (internal quotations omitted).
189. Id. at 694.
190. Id. at 695. On reconsideration, the Eighth District Court of Appeals clarified that plaintiffs
claims fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause and that additional grounds existed to render the
clause substantively unconscionable. See Arnold v. Burger King, 48 N.E.3d 69 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015),
appeal denied, 47 N.E.3d 166 (Ohio 2016).

191. Id.
192. See Banks v. Remington College, No. 1:11-CV-1267, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115634, at
**3-5 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 6, 2011).

193. See Deck v. Miami Jacobs Bus. College, No. 3:12-cv-63, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14845, at
**9-11 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 31, 2013).
194. See Porter v. MC Equities, LLC, No. 1:12 CV 1186,2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 123621, at *20*24 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 30, 2012).

195. Id. at **24-30.
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Concepcion, federal district courts in the Sixth Circuit apply Ohio law to
arbitration-related issues when "the Ohio legal rules at issue . . . are
nothing more than the generally applicable doctrines of contract
196
formation and unconscionability and do not disfavor arbitration."'
Ohio law then provides state law defenses to the enforcement of an
arbitration provision even while acknowledging the FAA's policy
favoring arbitration.' 97 "Because arbitration agreements are .
contracts," questions of contract formation remain the province of the
198
applicable state law.
In the two years since the Supreme Court's opinion in American
Express Company v. Italian Colors Restaurant,'99 Ohio courts have not
cited this precedent for any arbitration-related issue. This judicial
silence on how American Express impacts Ohio law echoes through
Sixth Circuit case law, also silent, with the exception of one case which
obliquely addresses American Express' impact on Ohio law as it relates
to arbitration.20 0 In Prasadv. General Electric,20 1 a federal district court
addressed whether the arbitral forum could "effectively vindicate" the
plaintiffs Ohio law "public policy tort claim." 20 2 Citing American
Express and other Supreme Court precedent, it noted that the FAA's
"effective vindication" exception only has been applied to federal
statutory claims.20 3 It acknowledged that arbitration agreements are
governed according to "applicable state law contract formation" with
contract defenses such as "'fraud, forgery, duress, mistake, lack of

consideration or mutual obligation, or unconscionability[,]"' potentially

196. Banks, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115634, at *4 n.2; see also Hagy v. Demers & Adams, LLC,
No. 2:11-cv-530, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12699, at **5-6 (S.D. Ohio Feb. 2, 2012).
197. Hagy, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12699, at *6.
198. Banks, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115634, at **3-4 (quoting Seawright v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs.,
Inc., 507 F.3d 967, 972 (6th Cir. 2007)).
199. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).
200. See generally Prasad v. GE, No. 2-13-CV-272, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30713 (S.D. Ohio
Mar. 10, 2014).
201. Id.
202. Id. at *5. The plaintiff in Prasadwas a senior staff engineer who agreed to arbitrate disputes
with his employer, GE Aviation. Id. at *2. The plaintiff was terminated by GE Aviation following his
numerous complaints to both his supervisors and the Federal Aviation Administration about engine
design and installation. Id. The plaintiff brought suit against his employer alleging his termination
violated Ohio public policy, the Ohio Civil Rights Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(), and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-3. Id. GE Aviation moved the district court "to
compel arbitration on [Prasad's] state law claims, and to stay the proceedings o[n] the Title VII claim."
Id. at *3. The federal district court in Prasadnoted that the enforceability of arbitration agreements are
governed according to "applicable state law contract formation" with contract defenses such as "'fraud,
forgery, duress, mistake, lack of consideration or mutual obligation, or unconscionability[,]'" potentially
invalidating arbitration agreements. Id. at *6 (citing Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 646,
666 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Cooper v. MRM Inv. Co., 367 F.3d 493, 498 (6th Cir. 2007)).
203. Id. at *7 (noting that in American Express, the Supreme Court upheld class action arbitration
waivers under the Sherman and Clayton Acts.)
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20
invalidating arbitration agreements. 04 The federal district court went on
to analyze the sufficiency of the arbitral forum for plaintiffs public
policy tort claims, and concluded that the arbitration agreement was
enforceable as to those claims.2 °5 It compelled arbitration of the Ohio
public policy tort claims and the Ohio Civil Rights claim while staying
the Title VII claims which were not governed by the arbitration
agreement.2 °6
In sum, Ohio courts, and federal courts applying Ohio law, enforce
arbitration agreements while upholding state law defenses rooted in the
jurisprudence of the Buckeye State. Enforcement or invalidation of
these arbitration agreements often turns on state law challenges of public
policy or unconscionability. Ohio courts reject any general bar to class
action waivers in consumer contracts. Instead, unlike the California
approach at issue in Concepcion, Ohio law reflects a fact specific, caseby-case analysis. The Supreme Court's recent decision in DIRECTV,
Inc. v. Imburgia, while reinforcing the FAA's presumption of
arbitrability, may very well allow Ohio and other state courts to continue
their evaluation of arbitration agreements in light of state common law
defenses and statutes.

V. DIRECTV, INc. v. IMBURGIA
In light of the common law's reverence for contracts, and the role of
state law in contract interpretation, the Supreme Court faced an
intriguing question in DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia.20 7 There, the Court
addressed whether the California court properly invalidated an
arbitration agreement executed pre-Concepcion when the agreement
allowed such action if state law would not enforce the class action
waiver in the agreement. 208 The case invoked the questions of whether
contract law is left to the states and what role the parties' intent at the
time of entering into the contract plays. 20 9 In a decisive 6-3 decision, the
law, and that consumers
Court held the FAA trumped now invalid2 1state
0
collectively.
claims
their
could not pursue
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
arbitration
209.

Id. at *6 (citing Morrison, 317 F.3d at 666) (quoting Cooper,367 F.3d at 498)).
Id. at **8-12.
Id. at **13-16.
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
Id. at 469. Under pre-Concepcion Californa law, the contract clause precluding class
would be unenforceable. Id. at 466.
For an interesting blog discussion of the case, see Ronald Mann, Argument preview: Justices

face off again with Californiacourt refusing to enforce arbitrationagreement, SCOTUSBIog (Oct. 2,

2015, 11:41 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/10/argument-preview-justices-face-off-again-withcalifornia-court-refusing-to-enforce-arbitration-agreement.
210. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 471.
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A. The CaliforniaCourts
Amy Imburgia and others sued DIRECTV in a class action lawsuit in
state court alleging violations of California state contract law in
connection with early termination fees. 2 11 Although the arbitration
agreement mandated arbitration and waived a class action option,
DIRECTV did not move to compel arbitration; California law would
render the agreement unenforceable under the Discover Bank rule.2 12
The trial court certified a class.2 13 One week later, the U.S. Supreme
Court issued its decision in Concepcion, holding that California's ban on
class action waivers contravened the FAA and therefore was void.2 14
"DIRECTV [then] moved to . . . decertify the class, and compel
arbitration[,], 215 claiming that given California law it would have been
futile to do so earlier.2 16 Instead, it was an argument viewed as futile,
and the court denied its motion.2 17 DIRECTV filed an appeal.2 18
The California appellate court conducted a de novo review of the
arbitration agreement. The contract provided that "any legal or equitable
claim relating to this Agreement, . . . if the claim is not resolved
informally,... will be resolved only by binding arbitration .... , 2 19 The
same section also precluded consolidating claims, proceeding by way of
a class, or as a private attorney general. 220 Finally, it stipulated that
"[i]f, however, the law of your state would find this agreement to
dispense with class arbitration procedures unenforceable, then this entire
22 1
Section 9 is unenforceable.,
The court noted that both parties argued that "the FAA 'requires
courts to enforce privately negotiated agreements to arbitrate, like other
contracts, in accordance with their terms,"' citing the Supreme Court
decision in Volt Information Sciences Inc. v. Leland Stanford Junior
University.222 This policy "applies even to 'agreements to arbitrate
' 223
under different rules than those set forth in the [FAA] itself."'
211. Imburgia v. DIRECTV, Inc., 170 Cal. Rptr. 3d 190, 192-93 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014).
212. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 471-472 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
213. Id. at 193.
214. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 340, 352 (2011).
215. Id.

216. See Tr. of Oral Argument at 6, DIRECTV Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (No. 14462).
217. DIRECTV, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
218. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 466.

219. DIRECTV, 170 Cal. Rptr. at 193.
220. Id.
221. Id.

222. Id. at 194, (citing Volt Info. Scis. v. Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478
(1989)).
223. DIRECTV, Cal. Rptr. 3d at 194 (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
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Contract terms "to abide by state rules of arbitration, enforcing those
rules according to the terms of the agreement[,] is fully consistent with
the goals of the FAA, 'even if application of the224state rules would yield
a different result from application of the FAA.'

The appellate court then turned to contract interpretation. It found
"further support in 'the common-law rule of contract interpretation that
a court should construe ambiguous language against the interest of the
party that drafted it.,,, 225 Given that DIRECTV had authored what the

court deemed an ambiguous document with respect to applicable law,
the company "[could] not now claim the benefit of the doubt., 226 The
state appellate court concluded that pre-Concepcion California law-in
effect when the parties executed the contract-would preclude the class
clause made the
action waiver and, further, that its non-severability
227
entire arbitration agreement unenforceable.
B. DIRECTV. v. Imburgia in the Supreme Court
DIRECTV fared better on its petition for certiorari to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The Court granted its motion,22 8 heard arguments
October 6, 2015, and expeditiously issued its ruling on Dec. 14, 2015. It
held in favor of DIRECTV, finding that the California court's decision
conflicted with the FAA, and that the arbitration agreement must be
enforced.22 9
On certiorari, Petitioner DIRECTV contended that Concepcion
invalidated California law, albeit subsequently to the parties' entering
into the contract. Therefore the mandatory arbitration and class action
waivers must be enforced.2 3 ° It reminded the justices that the California
court "did not even acknowledge the 'emphatic federal policy' in favor
of arbitration."2 3 '
Respondents countered that DIRECTV chose the language that "the
law of your state" would govern whether the arbitration agreement
provisions were enforceable,23 2 and that this is the language it applied
224. Id. (quoting Volt, 489 U.S. at 479).
225. Id. at 196 (quoting Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 514 U.S. 52, 62 (1995)).
226. Id. (quoting Mastrobuono, 514 U.S. at 163).
227. See id. at 196, 198.
228. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 170 Cal. Rptr.3d 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014), cert. granted,135 S.
Ct. 1547 (2015).
229. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at471.
230. Pet. for Cert. of Pet'r at 2, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015) (No. 14-462),
2014 WL 5359805, at *14.
231. Id. (citing Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631

(1985))....
232. Brief of Resp't in Opp'n to Pet. for Cert. at 16, DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463
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nationally in its contract. 2 3 3 Respondents further countered that is not
for DIRECTV to pick and choose which state laws apply. Therefore, by
the language "the law of your state" the parties intended to be governed
California law that at the time invalidated waivers of class actions in this
type of arbitration.23 4 Moreover, the California law at issue was not
Discover Bank, but California's consumer protection laws which "entitle
consumers to bring actions for unfair business practices, and to do so 235
as
a class, and which invalidate any contractual waiver" of class action.
Given that, California law would render unenforceable the DIRECTV
arbitration agreement containing a class action.236
The parties agreed that it was the intent of the parties to have
California state law control the contract, 237 and that California law
would not enforce the class action waiver. 238 As with contracts
generally, in enforcing and construing an arbitration clause, "courts and

arbitrators must 'give effect to the contractual rights and expectations of

the parties' ' 239 with "the parties' intentions control[ling], 240 However,
DIRECTV and Imburgia vigorously
disagreed on how and when courts
241
give effect to the parties' intent.

1. A Preview: Oral Argument
During oral arguments, the justices expressed several shared views

and concerns that resurfaced in their final opinions, informed the
decision, and may factor into the impact the decision has on state

courts. 242

Generally, the justices questioned whether the California

(2015) (No.14-462), 2015 WL 455815, at*1.
233. Id. at **1-2.
234. Id. at **1-2, 7-8.
235. Id. at *15 (internal citations omitted.)
236. Id.at *2.
237. BriefofPet'r at 1; Brief of Resp't at 2.
238. BriefofPet'r at 7; BriefofResp't at 4.
239. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 559 U.S. 662, 682 (2010) (quoting Volt
Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Standford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 479 (2009)).
240. Id. at 664 (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 473 U.S. at 626). For example, in BG Grp.
PLC v. Republic of Arg., 134 S. Ct. 1198 (2014), the Court held that contract terms allowed the
arbitrator to determine if local litigation were necessary, despite the existence of a treaty between the
countries involved.
241. DIRECTV argued that the presumption of arbitrability controls, especially where, as here,
the contract invoked the FAA, Brief of Pet'r at 9. Imburgia argued that a dispute that falls within an
arbitration agreement arises from a common-sense understanding of what the parties themselves
probably intended." Brief ofResp't at 21.
242. For an overview of the argument, see generally Adam Liptak, Supreme CourtSees DirecTV Class
Action
as
Too
Big
and
Too
Small,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
6,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/07/business/supreme-court-sees-directv-class-action-as-too-big-and-toosmall.html? r=0; see also Mann, supranote 209.
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court's interpretation of the contract was correct, whether the contract

was ambiguous, and whether the court had any business interjecting

itself into state law contract interpretation. 243 Even had the California
court erred, the justices suggested they found the task of reviewing state
court contract interpretation objectionable.24 4 They acknowledged that
if they engaged in reviewing state court contract interpretations, they
would face a flood of such cases, 245 and questioned what standard the
justices should use in reviewing them. 246 Moreover, tackling an
erroneous lower court contract interpretation prompted one justice to
inquire whether overturning state law would result in a "federalization"
of contract law.24 7
On the other hand, all United States courts must bow to Supreme

Court rulings.

Chief among the justices' concerns was whether

California courts, in allowing the class to proceed, were attempting to
perform an "end run" around the Court's decision in Concepcion,
judicial hostility to arbitration that the FAA was
essentially reflecting a248
counteract.
to
intended
2. The Imburgia Decision
The Court's repudiation of the California court decision was as

resounding as it was expeditious. The 6-3 majority 249 pounced on the
243. Justice Scalia drilled counsel for DIRECTV: "You need some test .... Where does it stop?
We're going to reinterpret every State interpretation of-of State law that-that ends up invalidating an
arbitration agreement? Certainly not. So what's the test?" Tr. of Oral Argument, supranote 216, at 12.
244. Id. at 24 ("But you know, wrongness is just not what we do here."). See also Liptak, supra
note 242.
245. Tr. of Oral Argument, supra note 216, at 50.
246. Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer both asked counsel for DIRECTV what
standard the Court should use in deciding what state contract disputes it should review. Id. at 12-13, 19.
Justice Scalia drilled counsel for DIRECTV: "You need some test .... Where does it stop? We're going
to reinterpret every State interpretation of-of State law that-that ends up invalidating an arbitration
agreement? Certainly not. So what's the test?" Id. at 12.
247. Justice Breyer noted in oral argument, "And suddenly we have Federalized, if not every area,
a huge area of State contract law." Id. at 10, 12. See also Liptak, supranote 242.
248. Justice Breyer wove the two concerns together:
So we have, on the one hand, the risks that we'll get into too many State law cases, if we take
their side. On the other hand, there is the risk that they'll run around our decisions. Now,
when you get to that second thing, even though I dissented [in Concepcion], I think it's an
extremely important thing in a country that has only nine judges here and thousands of
judges in other places who must follow our decisions - and think of the desegregation
matters, et cetera - that we be pretty firm on saying you can't run around our decisions, even
if they're decisions that I disagree with.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 216, at 50-51.
249. Justice Breyer delivered the opinion in which Justices Scalia, Anthony Kennedy, Samuel
Alito, Elena Kagan and Chief Justice John G. Roberts joined; Justice Clarence Thomas filed a dissenting
opinion and Justice Ginsburg filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Sonia Sotomayor joined.

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol84/iss3/5

28

Tracey and Hidy: It Takes Two to Tango: The Dance of the United States Supreme Cou

2016]

IT TAKES TWO TO TANGO

821,

California courts' application of now-invalidated California law when
the operative language of the arbitration agreement invoked the "law of
your state., 250 For contract interpretation, the Court deferred to state
courts: "California courts are the ultimate authority on [California]
law.",25' The majority instead went directly to determining whether the
California law, in light of Concepcion, was consistent with the FAA.2 52
The majority soundly rejected the argument that the contract term,
"the law of your state" would resurrect the invalidated California law
embodying the Discover Bank rule to defeat the FAA.2 53 Parties were
free to choose any law they wished to govern a dispute, even that of
Tibet or pre-revolutionary Russia. 254 They could even choose to include
the Discover Bank rule 255 that would render the arbitration agreement
unenforceable. However, those choice of law provisions were not
the contract at issue. Rather, the contract simply invoked
included in 256
"state law.,
California law did not support the appellate court's
application of a now defunct blanket ban on class arbitration. 257 "The
view that state law retains independent force even after it has been
authoritatively invalidated by this Court is one courts are unlikely to
accept as a general matter and to apply in other contexts., 258 As a result,
the lower courts' interpretation of the contract as applying a now invalid
law failed to place arbitration contracts "on equal footing with all other
"give 'due regard . . . to the federal policy
contracts., 259 It did ' 2not
60
arbitration.'
favoring
C. Imburgia's Impact on State Law
While the Imburgia decision reiterates Concepcion and the
preeminence of the FAA, the Court in Imburgia took great pains to
carve out the role of state courts in interpreting and applying state law
with respect to contracts. Although it analyzed the appellate court's

_3
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463 (2015).
250. Id. at 469-70.
251. Id. at468.
252. Id.
253. Id. at471.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 470-71. To its point, the Court noted that the lower courts had cited no California
precedent that would support the application of an invalid state law to a contract.
258. Id. at 470.
259. Id. at 471 (internal citation omitted).
260. Id. (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489
U.S. 468, 476 (1989)).
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application of California law which would invalidate a class action
waiver, it, like the appellate court, addressed Concepcion's invalidation
of the Discover Bank rule and not the California Consumer Legal
Remedies Act. In so doing the Court deferred to state law contract
interpretation. 261 Moreover, it focused on the Discover Bank rule's not
placing arbitration agreements on equal footing with other contracts.2 62
Sidestepping California statutes, the Court determined that the lower
court improperly resurrected Discover Bank to uphold the class action
waiver.2 63 In this way, Imburgia reinforces the role of state courts in
contract interpretation.
No such strong deference to state law appears in Concepcion. There,
the Court simply pitted the Discover Bank rule against the FAA:
"California's Discover Bank rule . . . interferes with arbitration.
Although the rule does not require class wide arbitration, it allows any
party to a consumer contract to demand it ex post. '2 64 Further, while
Concepcion undercut California state law with respect to its view of
unconscionability, the Imburgia Court explicitly looked to how
California law interpreted the term "the law of your state" as referring to
a now invalid law. In this vein, there was no support that any other
California court "would reach the same interpretation of 'law of your
' 265
state' in any context other than arbitration."
The Imburgia decision also underscores the role of precedent in
assessing the validity of a decision to vacate an arbitration agreement.
Such a track record is strongly evident in Ohio. Its courts have reached
consensus on tackling the enforceability of an arbitration agreement in a
contract. Unlike the California courts in Concepcion and Imburgia,
Ohio jurisprudence calls for invalidating an arbitration agreement only
after a case by case analysis of unconscionability and, public policy in
the context of a particular factual scenario.
The protections offered to consumers by Ohio's Consumer Sales
Practices Act are likely to remain intact. Under express circumstances,
the CSPA provides for consumers to pursue private action, and even
class action litigation. As a result, Ohio courts effectively restore a
party's right to resort to a judicial forum, or a class action, even in the
face of an arbitration agreement waiving these rights. Judges can do so,
in part, because unlike California law, the CSPA does not void an
261.
law.").
262.
263.
264.
265.
California
71.

Id. at 468 ("[W]e recognize that California courts are the ultimate authority on California
Id. at 471.
Id. at 468-471.
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 347 (2011) (emphasis in original).
Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. at 469. To its point, the Court noted that the lower courts had cited no
precedent that would support the application of an invalid state law to a contract. Id. at 469-
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arbitration agreement in a consumer contract simply because it contains
a class action waiver. Imburgia's clear deference to state contract law,
combined with Ohio's careful approach, each suggests that when
appropriate, Ohio courts will void arbitration agreements where
consumers have defenses at law or in equity as the FAA intends.
VI. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's emerging jurisprudence on arbitration
enforcement increasingly challenges state law initiatives to keep the
courthouse doors open where arbitration agreements contravene. These
new steps by the Supreme Court around state law is a recent judicial
redefining of Congress' clear and long-standing mandate to wed
arbitration enforcement to common law contract principles.
Decisions strictly enforcing arbitration agreements have had a
profound impact on business-consumer relationships. They also have
skewed the power balance between contracting parties in favor of the
dominant party. That these contracts routinely are made available
online, requiring a party to simply acknowledge having read and
understood the contract before hitting "I agree," reinforces the question
of whether there indeed has been a meeting of the minds.
The reshaping of the law surrounding the enforceability of arbitration
agreements also may have a profound effect on each state's common
law. The Imburgia case presents intriguing questions involving state
contract law defenses and the intent of the parties. Will defenses like
unconscionability and ineffective remedies be "federalized," as Justice
Breyer warned? The Imburgia dicta suggests that the Court will defer to
state common law, as long as state courts remain vigilant in preserving
the presumption of arbitrability and the force of contracts.
In its own way, Ohio law has developed around the Supreme Court
precedent, allowing arbitration enforcement challenges under statutory
rights as well as state common law principles. Ohio courts continue to
use Ohio common law contract principles to define, demarcate, and
defeat arbitration agreements. Their careful approach suggests that,
under Ohio law, consumers and other parties to arbitration agreements
may be less constrained by mandatory arbitration clauses than recent
Supreme Court cases suggest.
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